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 Does political pressure matter in bank lending?  
Evidence from China 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence 
indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by 
commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This 
association is particularly true for state-owned banks, which are much more politically 
pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed 
banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are 
less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety 
of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study 
contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of 
government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation. 
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1 
“Why does China have a GDP target at all? ... The reasons are political. In a country 
so large, central leaders are always fearful of losing their grip on far-flung bureaucrats: 
setting GDP targets is one means by which they believe can evaluate and control these 
lower down.” 
— “Grossly deceptive plans”, The Economist, January 30th 2016 issue 
 
1. Introduction 
On January 19th 2016, China declared its latest gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
figure – 6.9% in 2015. Perhaps, not surprisingly, this is neatly within the government’s 
target of “around 7%”. China is the only large industrial country that sets GDP targets 
and influence, or even control, the economy in order to achieve that. In the 
government’s five-year plan, the central government establishes for all provinces their 
GDP growth target, which is usually the most important assessment criteria for local 
political leaders.1 If the real GDP growth rate fails to meet or overachieve the goals, 
local officials would face enormous political pressures, and their political future could 
even be diminished.  
In this paper, we study the role of government in the economy of China by 
examining whether/how the political pressures upon local officials affect the growth of 
bank loans issued by commercial banks. Since most of the assessment criterion are 
descriptive and unmeasurable2 and, more importantly, given the significance of GDP 
targets in China’s distinctive political system, we measure political pressures upon 
provincial leaders as the shortfalls of the actual GDP growth of each province to its 
target GDP growth or the average GDP growth of its adjacent provinces. It is well 
argued in the literature that the GDP growth rate is a major political concerns for 
Chinese government officials (e.g., Rawski, 2001; Chow, 2004; Li and Zhou, 2005; 
Burdekin and Siklos, 2008) and could significantly affects the turnover decisions made 
by the central government (Chen et al., 2005). In particular, we believe that local 
officials are facing considerably high political pressures if the above measures are 
                                                             
1 In this paper, we use local officials, political leaders, and provincial leaders interchangeably. 
2 In China local officials are often judged by environmental standards, social policies, being uncorruptive, 
in tune with the party’s direction, and etc. But GDP is the most important assessment criterion because 
it is measureable and observable. 
2 
positive and, therefore, they are more likely to take proactive measures to stimulate the 
provincial economy.  
There is an ongoing debate regarding the role of government in the economy and 
financial markets. On the one side, the development view suggests that government 
intervention in financial markets promote economic development by channelling credit 
to the sectors of economy prioritized by the governments. However, this view is less 
supported by previous studies (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2002; Caprio and Peria, 2002; La 
Porta et al., 2002), which consistently show a negative relation between government 
intervention and economic growth. On the opposite side, the political view emphasizes 
the political objectives of government intervention in financial markets (e.g., La Porta 
et al., 2002; Brown and Dinc, 2005; Dinc, 2005) and argues that politicians in power 
are inclined to exploit financial resources, particularly those owned or controlled by the 
government, to appease their supporters who subsequently return the favour through 
voting, political contributions and bribes (e.g., Kornai, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
Despite the accumulated empirical evidence supporting the political view, there has 
been limited research on politically motivated and driven actions taken by commercial 
banks in terms of bank loans. 
We choose China to investigate our research question because the problem of 
political intervention is expected to be greater in China as compared with other 
emerging economies. First, despite the significant economy reform and remarkable 
economic development, China’s central and local government maintain substantial 
influences over the overall economy by controlling the allocation of key economic 
resources, like land and credit.3 Second, China’s rapid growth is mainly attributed to 
the globalization of trade, but China has yet to globalize its banking sector (Berger et 
al., 2009). China’s banking sector remains dominated by four colossal state-owned 
banks (i.e., the Big Four banks)4, which account for about three-quarters of industry 
assets. Finally, China features the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal 
                                                             
3 The power of China’s governments in controlling economics resources distinguishes her from other 
ex-communist transitional economics such as Russia (Chen et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014). 
4 They are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), 
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Bank of China (BOC). 
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decentralization. Specifically, the personnel management of provincial leaders is solely 
controlled by the central government, and the provincial economic performance is a 
crucial indicator in personnel evaluation. As such, the central government rewards and 
punishes local officials through a yardstick competition on the basis of regional 
economic performance (Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin et al., 2000; Li and Zhou, 2005).5  
Using provincial data from 2002 to 2011, we find that the growth rate of bank 
loans increases with the political pressure on local officials. This relation is significant 
and robust when controlling for macroeconomic factors as well as the personal 
characteristics of provincial leaders. Intuitively, our results indicate that provincial 
leaders have stronger influences on the state-owned banks, while other domestic and 
foreign banks don’t seem to be affected. Moreover, the uneven institutional 
development across regions in China allows us to examine the extent to which the 
association is affected by the degree of banking marketization. Our results show that 
the impact of political pressures on the growth of bank loans is moderated in regions 
with a higher level of banking marketization, suggesting that economic liberalization is 
effective in preventing government intervention in financial institutions. 
We then shift our focus to the efficiency of bank lending and the quality of bank 
loans. Following Podpiera (2006), we define efficiency as the sensitivity of lending 
growth rate to provincial profitability. Our results show that bank lending is less 
commercially oriented (a higher sensitivity level) and have much lower quality when 
local officials are facing greater political pressures. Overall, these results confirm our 
inferences drawing on the political view that the government forces banks to increase 
lending to serve their politically agenda rather than to achieve greater economic 
objectives, and loans issued under such circumstance suffer lower efficiency and quality. 
We conduct a number of robustness checks to test the validity of our results. First, 
we repeat the main analyses using the excessive growth of bank loans as the dependent 
variable, and our results remain unchanged. Second, we find that a province 
                                                             
5 The political motives of Chinese local officials arise mainly from political pressure empowered by the 
performance-based promotion scheme rather than the campaign-driven political actions that are 
pervasive in western countries. 
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significantly increases its bank credit supply in the last two years of a five-year-plan 
cycle if its GDP growth in the first three years falls behind the target set in the five-year 
plan. This evidence reinforces our argument that local officials rely heavily on credit 
supply to stimulate the regional GDP in order to achieve better scores in the 
performance evaluation system. Finally, our results remain qualitatively unaltered when 
we employ the change model to better identify the causal relationship between political 
pressure and the banks’ lending behaviour.  
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, our findings 
add evidence to the literature on the political influences on bank lending (La Porta et 
al., 2002; Brown and Dinc, 2005; Dinc, 2005). To our best knowledge, our paper is the 
first to provide direct evidence of the role played by political pressure in determining 
the banks’ lending behaviour in China. Second, our paper contributes to the growing 
empirical literature on the political incentives of government officials, both in the 
context of China and in general (Besley and Case, 1992; Maskin et al., 2000; Chen et 
al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005). In particular, our paper is closely related to Li and Zhou 
(2005), who find that the likelihood of promotion for provincial leaders is positively 
associated with the regional economic performance. We, however, focus on the political 
pressure on provincial leaders and its link with bank lending decisions. Finally, our 
paper contributes to the debate on the role of government in transitional economies. 
Frye and Shleifer (1996) put forward the “helping hand” and the “grabbing hand” 
approaches. The former portrays the idea that the government seeks to guide and 
stimulate economic growth by reallocating financial resources, while the latter argues 
that government officials do not aim to maximize social welfare but pursue their own 
selfish objectives. Our study provides evidence consistent with the latter argument.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
institutional background. Section 3 develops our research hypotheses. Section 4 
explains the research design, including the measurement of variables, model 
specification, sample selection and data sources. Section 5 reports the empirical results 
and their interpretations. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Institutional background 
2.1 China’s economy and economic plans 
The growing interest among academics, investors and regulators around the world 
in the Chinese-style capitalism stems from China’s increasing economic importance in 
the world. China has been growing at around 10% per year over the last three decades, 
and in 2010 China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy according to 
nominal GDP and purchasing power parity (PPP). Moreover, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates China’s GDP (in terms of PPP) at $17.6tn against the 
US’s $17.4tn in 2014, indicating that China has officially overtaken the US as the 
biggest economy in the world.6 
China’s success is partly attributed to the model of state capitalism, in which 
planning plays a vital role in the economic development. Every five years, starting from 
1953, the Chinese central government has formulated a national five-year plan 
containing detailed economic development guidelines for all industries and provinces.7 
China’s first five-year plan covered the period of 1953-1957, with a focus on 
“developing heavy industries”. Since then, China has implemented eleven five-year 
plans, with the twelfth five-year guideline started in 2011.8 
The formulation of the five-year plan is a top-down process. In response to the 
national five-year plan set by the central government, each province also stipulates a 
provincial-level five-year plan with adjustments as appropriate. Additionally, local 
governments have to present official annual reports, review current year’s achievements 
and challenges, and set up targets (not restricted to economics targets) for the coming 
year.  
The most relevant and important figure in the official documents is the target of 
                                                             
6 Details can be found in the article in The Financial Times titled “China’s leap forward: overtaking the 
US as world’s biggest economy” (October 08, 2014). 
7 The idea of five-year plans originated from the former Soviet Union, whose philosophy was that the 
socialist economy should progress based on plans. Countries (including non-socialist countries) that have 
used or still use five-year plans include China, Cuba, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, Vietnam, Argentina, 
Bhutan, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, South Korea and Malaysia (Chen et al., 2013).  
8 The name of the eleventh five-year programme was changed from “plan” to “guideline”. This was 
done to reflect China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy, as 
well as the more democratic and transparent formulation process.  
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GDP growth rate. Economic performance is a key indicator used in the personnel 
evaluation system in China (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005). This has created 
growing criticism in recent years because the local governments tend to be eager for 
instant success and thus invest in projects that may not maximize long-term benefits. 
Motivated by career concerns, local officials may even engage in statistical falsification. 
As a result, some scholars have called for the GDP growth target to be abolished in the 
official documents.9 
 
2.2 The political system in China 
China is highly politically centralized and has five hierarchical levels of 
government: central, provincial, prefecture, county, and township.10 The Politburo of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) acts as the supreme 
decision-making organization of this “multidivisional” system (Chen et al., 2013), 
which ultimately controls the mobility of government officials within the system 
(Huang, 2002; Li and Zhou, 2005).  
Provinces are the second level of China’s political system. As of 2014, there were 
31 provincial units in China,11 including four centrally administrated cities (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), 22 provinces and five autonomous regions (Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Guangxi). The provincial party secretary is the 
top leader at the provincial level, followed by the provincial governor. This reflects the 
dual presence of the communist party and the government organs in China’s political 
system (Li and Zhou, 2005). 
China began the major reforms of its economy in 1978. These reforms, especially 
the introduction of a “fiscal contracting system”,12 have empowered provincial leaders 
with the ultimate authority over allocating economic resources in their jurisdictions. 
This, on the one hand, has significantly increased the strategic importance of the 
                                                             
9 Details of this story can be found at http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001049291/?print=y (in Chinese). 
10 Following previous research (e.g., Jin et al., 2005) and because of data availability, the present paper 
focuses on the central-provincial relations.   
11 This excludes Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. 
12 See Jin et al. (2005) for further descriptions of China’s fiscal contracting system.  
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provincial leaders in local economic development (Qian and Xu, 1993). On the other 
hand, the provincial leaders have become more liable for the corresponding results 
arising from their decisions. 
In addition, China’s economic reforms also triggered the reform of its personnel 
control system. This has shifted the focus of personnel evaluation criteria away from 
political loyalty, which was the only important criterion for promotion prior to the 
reform, to economic performance (Chen et al., 2005). Although personal characteristics 
of a politician, including age, education and expertise in administrative management, 
also matter, local economic performance is the most important criterion on which 
central officials assess local officials. Within the multidivisional-form (M-form) 
structure of China’s economic system, each provincial leader’s performance is 
individually distinguishable and comparable (Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin et al., 2000), 
which enables the use of a relative performance evaluation system by the central 
government. Consequently, local officials have become obsessed with their economic 
ranking among their peers. Every year, the government reports or provincial yearbooks 
provide detailed information on the relative performance rankings of each province, in 
areas ranging from GDP growth to infrastructure construction (Li and Zhou, 2005). 
Unlike western countries, where political turnover is determined by the general 
public through democratic elections, China’s centralized political hierarchy makes the 
political turnover more predictable. For example, a well-performing provincial leader 
is more likely to move up the ladder to the central government level, including 
Ministries and Commissions, the State Council, the Politburo or even the Politburo 
Standing Committee. As well as promotion, a punishment mechanism, including forced 
retirement and demotions,13 is also employed as an incentive. Given the few options 
outside the internal political labour market, Chinese government officials’ concerns 
over their career prospects for promotion or termination are effective motivating them 
to fulfil the policy targets assigned by the central government and to compete against 
each other within the political system. 
                                                             
13 For brevity, we group them together and refer to both as terminations.  
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2.3 China’s banking sector 
China has a bank-based financial system, with the banking sector accounting for 
two-thirds of the economy’s capital, more than double the share in the US and 1.5 times 
the share in most other economies (Farrell et al., 2006). China’s banking sector is 
characterized by the dominance of the state ownership of banks, which allows for 
government intervention in the decision making of those banks (Firth et al., 2009). Prior 
to the late 1990s, the primary role of China’s banking sector was to channel low-cost 
capital to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), even poorly performing ones, because of 
their scale and government ownership. Moreover, the banks, especially the local bank 
branches, were subject to great pressure from local officials to grant loans to politically 
favoured enterprises. As a result, policy lending was a salient characteristic of the 
banking system. 
As a consequence of the policy-directed lending, the Chinese banks had 
accumulated enormous amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs). According to the 
statistics, the state banks’ share of NPLs over total loans was 20% in 1994. This ratio 
increased to 25% in 1997 and then to 35% in 2000 (Tung, 2002; Firth et al., 2009). To 
address this problem, the government was forced to undertake a series of actions. First, 
China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 
2001. As a milestone move to honour its WTO commitments, China released the Rules 
for Implementing the Regulations Governing Foreign Financial Institutions in the 
People’s Republic of China in January 2002. By December 2006, China had fully 
opened up its banking sector to foreign firms so that they could gradually expand their 
business in China over the next five years. Second, four asset management companies 
(Cinda, Oriental, Great Wall and Huarong) were established to assist the Big Four banks 
in addressing their loan problems. As a result of these efforts, the NPL ratios of the Big 
Four banks declined sharply from 2002 to 2009 (Barth et al., 2013). Third, the 
government encouraged banks to be listed on stock exchanges to enhance external 
monitoring. The public listing of the Big Four state-owned banks was successfully 
completed by the end of 2010. For instance, ICBC made the initial public offers (IPOs) 
9 
on both Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges in October 2006 and raised a 
staggering $21.9 billion (Berger et al., 2009). The record was broken by the IPO from 
the Agricultural Bank of China in 2010, which raised $22.1 billion in Hong Kong.14 
Finally, the government deregulated the banking sector by allowing several joint-stock 
commercial banks, city banks, and rural and urban credit cooperatives to operate in 
China. Moreover, foreign banks were also allowed to establish branches in China, and 
to make strategic minority investments in many of the state-owned commercial banks. 
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of China’s commercial banking industry. 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses 
Previous research consistently suggests that government ownership of banks is 
associated with lower subsequent bank performance and economic growth (e.g., Caprio 
and Peria, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Bonin et al., 2005; Berger 
et al., 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009). This is broadly consistent with the “political view” 
that government-owned banks are used by politicians to serve their own political goals. 
This phenomenon is presumably more pronounced in countries with underdeveloped 
financial systems and poorly protected property rights, such as China (La Porta et al., 
2002). For example, Berger et al. (2009) find that the Big Four banks in China are the 
least efficient of all banks, but that minority foreign ownership of the Big Four banks 
can improve bank efficiency. This is corroborated by Lin and Zhang (2009), who 
document that the Big Four banks are less profitable and less efficient than other types 
of banks in China. Chang et al. (2010) examine the effects of bank fund reallocation on 
regional economic growth in China from 1991 to 2005. They fail to find any correlation 
between either bank fund reallocation or bank loans and regional economic growth, 
which suggests that the lending decisions of Chinese banks are largely policy-driven 
rather than market-oriented.  
Relative to the effects of government ownership of banks, the question of how 
bank lending is politically motivated has been much less studied. Sapienza (2004) finds 
                                                             
14 The world’s biggest IPO, to date, is the US-listed offering made by The Alibaba Group in 2014. 
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that the interest rates charged by government-owned banks in Italy are associated with 
the local power of the party that controls the bank. Dinc (2005) shows that government-
owned banks tend to increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms in Pakistan borrow more 
from state-owned banks and are more likely to default. However, the empirical evidence 
from China is very limited, with the exception of Ho et al. (2013), who find an increase 
in lending made by Chinese state-owned banks during the recent financial crisis when 
they were mandated by the government to extend credit. The interpretation is that 
China’s state-owned banking system, as a policy instrument, is subsumed into the 
government’s macroeconomic agenda.  
Based on our discussion of the institutional background and the extant literature, 
the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal decentralization in China allows 
for a yardstick competition to take place among local officials. On the one hand, the 
personnel control is centralized in the hands of central government and economic 
performance is a crucial indicator used in personnel evaluations. On the other hand, the 
local governments have substantial influences over the local financial resources, 
including bank credit. As a result, in order to build up the economy and thus relieve the 
personal political pressure, provincial leaders are likely to increase bank lending by 
exerting influence over the banks in their jurisdictions. Moreover, the political influence 
is expected to be greater for Big Four state-owned banks, which are much more 
politically pressurized and undertake more non-economic obligations than other banks. 
Previous literature also suggests that politically motivated lending mainly exists in 
state-owned banks (La Porta et al., 2002; Dinc, 2005). Thus, we formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between the political pressure on provincial 
leaders and the growth of bank loans. 
H2: The predicted positive relation from H1 is more pronounced for the Big 
Four banks than for others. 
 
11 
The institutional environment in China varies across regions because different 
regions are moving towards a market-oriented economy at different paces (Chen et al., 
2006; Lai et al., 2013). Prior literature documents that regional marketization plays an 
essential role in affecting the financial practices of Chinese firms, including capital 
structure (Li et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011), corporate fraud (Chen et al., 2006), dividend 
payouts (Chen et al., 2009), investment comovement (Chen et al., 2013), foreign direct 
investment (Du et al., 2008) and so forth. In a related study, Firth et al. (2009) find that 
political connections are less important and financial performance are more important 
in determining credit allocation in regions with more developed banking sectors. 
Applying this logic to our setting, we hypothesize that the level of regional banking 
liberalization moderates the political influence on bank lending: 
 
H3: The positive association between political pressure and the growth of bank 
loans is weaker in regions with more developed banking sectors. 
 
    As a result of political interference in the credit market, the lending decisions of 
banks may not be made on a commercial basis but instead out of political considerations. 
Under the system of relative performance evaluation, local politicians are only 
interested in the achievements reaped from apparent short-term success, even at the 
expense of the long-term prosperity. According to our description in earlier sections, 
local officials are promoted almost entirely based on their locality’s growth rates, giving 
them a huge incentive to meet or even beat the GDP growth targets. Once local officials 
are promoted to a higher rank, the losses or bad debts of banks incurred during their 
premiership will become the liabilities of their successors. As such, we predict a 
negative association between political pressure and bank lending efficiency as follows: 
 
H4: Bank lending is less commercially oriented under greater political 
pressure. 
H5: There is a negative association between political pressure and loan quality. 
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4. Research design and data 
4.1 Measurement of main variables 
4.1.1 Bank credit growth 
Following the vast prior literature, we measure the main dependent variable, 
growth of bank loans (∆Loani,t), as the percentage change in province i’s total bank 
loans from year t-1 to year t. To disentangle the effect of political pressure on banks 
with different ownership, we measure the loan growth as the annual growth rate of bank 
lending from the Big Four banks, other domestic banks and foreign banks, respectively, 
when testing hypothesis H2.  
 
4.1.2 Political pressure 
China’s local officials come under pressure regarding the regional GDP growth 
rate because it is directly related to their prospects of promotion or termination (Wu, 
2000; Rawski, 2001; Li and Zhou, 2005). Following the economic growth target set in 
the national five-year plan, local governments set their own targets in the regional five-
year plan. We employ two measures to capture the political pressure: GAP5YRi,t is the 
difference between the target GDP growth rate committed in province i’s five-year plan 
and its actual GDP growth rate in year t; and GAPNBi,t is the difference between the 
average GDP growth rate of province i’s adjacent neighbours and its actual growth rate 
in year t.15 Both measures are scaled by the actual GDP growth rate of province i in 
year t. Higher values of the measures indicate greater political pressure on the local 
officials. 
 
4.1.3 Banking market development 
                                                             
15 According to the classification of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), China can be 
classified into four regions in terms of their level of economic development. The eastern region includes 
the following 10 provinces and municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai and Zhejiang. The central region includes the following 6 provinces: Anhui, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Shanxi. The western region includes the following 12 provinces and 
municipalities: Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, 
Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The northeastern region includes Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin. 
For instance, Beijing’s GAPNBt is computed as the mean of the actual GDP growth rates of the 9 eastern 
regions other than Beijing minus the actual GDP growth rate of Beijing in year t. 
13 
China’s private firms are discriminated against by the state-dominated financial 
markets, which impede the progress of marketization (Brandt and Li, 2003). Following 
Bushman et al. (2013), we measure the degree of banking market development as the 
percentage of bank loans issued to non-state-owned enterprises. A higher value of the 
percentage suggests that, on average, bank decisions about credit allocation are largely 
motivated by profit maximization and less by political considerations. We obtain the 
measures from the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of the 
Marketization of China’s provinces, constructed by Fan et al. (2011).16 
Table A.1 presents the marketization index by province and year. Individually, 
Zhejiang has the highest average value, followed by Guangdong and Jiangsu. The 
province with the least developed banking market is Jilin, followed by Heilongjiang 
and Gansu. Beyond this, the eastern regions have higher values than the other regions 
in general, which is consistent with the uneven economic growth in China’s regions. 
 
4.2 Model specification 
4.2.1 Test of H1 and H2 
To test hypothesis H1, concerning the influence of political pressure on bank loan 
growth, we estimate the following model: 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (1) 
where, for province i and year t, ∆Loan is the annual growth rate of bank loans. Pressure 
is the political pressure, separately measured by GAP5YR or GAPNB as defined in Section 
4.1.2. If hypothesis H1 is true, then 𝛽1 should be significantly positive. 
Following previous research (e.g., Firth et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2009), we 
include a vector of control variables to capture possible confounding effects, as follows: 
∆GDPi,t is measured as the percentage change of province i’s GDP from year t-1 to year 
t. ∆Depositi,t is measured as the percentage change of province i’s deposits from year t-
1 to year t. Branchi,t is the logarithm of the number of bank branches in province i and 
year t. SOEi,t is measured by the ratio of revenues from state-owned enterprises to those 
                                                             
16 Since the data are only available up to 2009, we use the 2009 index to measure the level of banking 
market development for 2010 and 2011. 
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from all enterprises in province i and year t. Fiscali,t measures the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, computed as the ratio of province i’s spending to central spending, 
expressed in per capita terms, and multiplied by (1- province i’s GDP/national GDP), 
following Zhang and Zou (1998). Opennessi,t measures economic openness, calculated 
as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP in province i and year t. Industryi,t 
is the total value of secondary industry divided by GDP in province i and year t. 
In addition to these macroeconomic factors, we also control for a set of 
characteristics of the provincial leaders.17 Age is measured as the logarithm of the age 
of the provincial committee secretary. Age60 is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
leader is 60 or older, and zero otherwise. Age is a critical variable determining political 
turnover (Li and Zhou, 2005). Officials who are 60 or older will be forced to retire 
within five years under the 65-years-of-age retirement rule, making them less politically 
motivated to promote economic growth (Xu and Wang, 2010). Tenure is the number of 
years for which the provincial leader has been in the post. Promotion is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the provincial leader was promoted from within the 
provincial government. Education measures the level of education, set to 3, 2, 1, or 0 
for PhD, Master’s, Bachelor’s or lower, respectively. Experience measures expertise in 
economics and management. It is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
provincial leader previously held a post in the provincial or a higher level of 
government in which he/she was directly involved in formulating and implementing 
economic plans.18 The variable definitions are presented in Table A.2. 
To take a closer look at whether the political influence in bank loans varies among 
banks of different ownership, as posited in hypothesis H2, we re-examine Eq.(1) and 
disaggregate the total loans into loans issued by the Big Four banks, other domestic 
banks and foreign banks, respectively. If our hypothesis H2 holds, then 𝛽1 should be 
more significant when the Big Four banks act as the lenders. 
                                                             
17 In the present study, we focus on provincial committee secretaries, because they are considered the 
most powerful officials in each province (Li and Zhou, 2005).  
18  These posts mainly include those at the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Economic and Trade Commission, the People’s Bank of China, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, the CBRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission. 
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4.2.2 Test of H3 
To test hypothesis H3 that the effect of political pressure on bank lending is 
attenuated in regions with a higher degree of banking marketization, we estimate the 
equation as follows: 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
                                 ∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (2) 
where the degree of regional marketization is measured using the financial 
marketization index that is developed by the National Economic Research Institute of 
China. Each year provinces are grouped into three terciles. NERI equals three if the 
province-year is ranked as the highest tercile, two for the intermediate, and one for the 
lowest. Thus, we expect the coefficient on 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐼 (𝛽3) is significantly 
negative. 
 
4.2.3 Test of H4 
To test the influence of political pressure on lending efficiency, we follow 
Podpiera (2006) and estimate the following equation: 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
+∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (3) 
where Surplus is a proxy for the profitability of all enterprises in province i, computed 
as the ratio of operating surplus to GDP in province i.19 A positive relation between 
Surplus and ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛  can be interpreted as an indication of growing commercial 
orientation. Applying this logic, if political pressure reduces bank lending efficiency, 
then we should observe that the coefficient on 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠  ( 𝛽3 ) is 
significantly negative.  
 
4.2.4. Test of H5 
                                                             
19 Podpiera (2006) argues that while the operating surplus data may reflect profitability of state-owned 
enterprises more closely than that of other enterprises. It can be used as a proxy for financial performance 
of all enterprises since there is no reliable and comprehensive data on the performance of all enterprises 
by regions.  
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Finally, to test hypothesis H5 concerning the impact of political pressure on loan 
quality, we follow Schaeck et al. (2009) and estimated the following equation:20 
𝑁𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+3 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+3 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+3 
                 +𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+3 + 𝛽5 𝑀_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+3+𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
where NLoan is measured as the percentage of non-performing loans to total loans. 
M_structure is a proxy for market structure, measured as the proportion of total assets 
held by the four largest banks in China. The other variables share the same definitions 
as those in Section 4.2.1. The independent variable, Pressure, is lagged at least one 
period with respect to the dependent variable, NLoan, to allow for the fact that it takes 
time for political pressure to have its full impact on the loan quality. Since the data on 
loan quality is only available from 2009 to 2013, our sample is reduced to a smaller 
size. If hypothesis H5 holds, then 𝛽1 should be significantly positive.  
 
4.3 Sample and data 
Our sample covers 2002-2011, a ten-year period. Most of the data used in this 
study have been manually collected from various sources. For example, the data of bank 
lending come from the official website of the CBRC and the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking. The GDP growth targets come from regional five-year plans and 
annual government reports. The characteristics of the provincial leaders come mainly 
from People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Net, among others. Macroeconomic data, 
including GDP growth and operating surplus, is drawn from the China Statistical 
Yearbooks. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
mitigate the effect of outliers. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection process. The initial sample consists of 310 
province-year observations. Tibet province is excluded from our sample due to data 
unavailability. We also delete observations without GDP growth goals. The sample 
selection process yields a final sample of 294 observations (province-year).  
[Insert Table 1] 
                                                             
20 Our control variables are less than those in Schaeck et al (2009) because of different research setting.   
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 Summary statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the main analyses. 
The average and median levels of credit growth are 14.1% and 14%, respectively, 
suggesting that bank lending is ubiquitous in China. Political pressure, measured by 
GAP5YR is negative in terms of mean and median, which reveals that local officials may 
set low targets to lessen the pressure. Nevertheless, GAPNB is positive on average, which 
suggests that political pressure becomes greater when a relative performance evaluation 
system is introduced. SOEs contribute more than 40% of local economy, consistent with 
China’s economy being characterized by state-capitalism. International business and 
secondary industry constitute a large proportion of China’s economy, consistent with 
China’s status as an export-oriented country and world manufacturing centre. The 
average age of the provincial leaders is about 59 years, varying from 36 to 69 years. 
More than half of the leaders are older than 60 years. On average, provincial leaders 
hold the office for three and a half years and 42.3% of them were promoted from with 
the provincial government. The leaders have a Bachelor’s degree or higher on average, 
and 42% of them have previous work experience in economics departments.  
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. Credit growth is significantly 
positively correlated with political pressure (correlation coefficients: 0.265 for GAP5YR, 
and 0.101 for GAPNB). This lends initial support to hypothesis H1 that local officials 
are likely to cope with political pressure by expanding bank credit. As expected, the 
two pressure variables are highly correlated with each other. In addition, credit growth 
is positively correlated with deposit growth (Deposit: 0.670), the number of bank 
branches (Branch: 0.125), local fiscal power (Deficit: 0.102) and the educational 
background of the provincial leader (Education: 0.108), and negatively correlated with 
the percentage contributed by the state-owned economy (SOE: -0.251). Finally, the 
correlations among the non-dependent variables are less than 0.7 in general. Thus, 
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multicollinearity should not be a concern in this study.21 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
5.2 Political pressure and credit growth: Test of H1 
Table 4 reports the regression results of testing hypothesis H1. In the first two 
columns, we report the regressions with GAP5YR as the independent variable. 
Regardless of whether the characteristics of provincial leaders are included, the 
coefficients on GAP5YR are statistically positive (in column 2: coefficient=0.072, t-
stat=2.114). This supports our conjecture that regional banks are forced to expand credit 
when local officials face the pressure of not being able to achieve the economic goals. 
Similar results are observed in columns (3) and (4) (in column 4: coefficient=0.076, t-
stat=1.869), where GAPNB is used as the independent variable. This implies that local 
officials have greater pressure and are more likely to push local banks to issue credit 
when they are outperformed by the adjacent provincial leaders. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The signs of the coefficients on control variables are broadly consistent with the 
predicted ones. For instance, the coefficients on ∆GDP are positive and significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that the growth rate of loans is primarily driven by regional 
economic growth. In addition, the coefficients on ∆Deposit are positive and significant, 
which is consistent with Jayaratne and Morgan’s (2000) finding that faster deposit 
growth signals a growing demand for loans. Branch has positive coefficients although 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the competitiveness of the banking sector 
increases with the allocation of credit made by the banks. The coefficients on Openness 
are positive and significant, indicating that loans are in higher demand in wealthier and 
export-oriented regions. Finally, Age60 is negatively associated with credit growth, 
consistent with Li and Zhou’s (2005) finding that officials who are older than 60 are 
less likely to be promoted and therefore have less motivation to build up the economy 
                                                             
21 Lind et al. (2002) point out that multicollinearity may exist if the correlation coefficients exceed 0.7, 
which is a typical threshold used to identify its presence. 
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through bank credit.  
 
5.3 Subsample analysis: Test of H2 
    Table 5 presents results of examining hypothesis H2. Columns (1) and (2) report 
results when loans are issued by the Big Four state-owned banks. Consistent with our 
prediction, both measures of political pressure are significantly positive. However, as 
shown in the rest of columns, the relation becomes insignificant for other domestic 
banks and foreign banks, whose lending decisions are less likely to be made on a 
political basis. Overall, the results suggest that the primary role of state-owned banks 
is to serve policy goals rather than seek profit, which partially explains why state-owned 
banks underperform their foreign counterparts in China (Berger et al., 2009).  
[Insert Table 5] 
 
5.4 Banking marketization, political pressure and credit growth: Test of H3 
According to hypothesis H3, the relationship between political pressure and credit 
growth may not be uniform between regions with more and less developed banking 
sectors. Our results from testing this hypothesis are reported in Table 6. Consistent with 
Firth et al. (2009), banking marketization changes the effect of political pressure on 
credit growth. Specifically, the coefficients on 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐼  are significantly 
negative for both measures of political pressure, indicating that the institutional 
environment, especially the banking liberalization, is an important mechanism that 
moderates political interference in bank decisions.  
[Insert Table 6] 
 
5.5 Political pressure and lending efficiency: Test of H4 
Table 7 presents the regression results of testing hypothesis H4. The coefficients 
on Surplus are positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that on average the 
profitability of regional enterprises is an important determinant of lending growth. 
However, this positive relation is moderated by political pressure. Specifically, the 
coefficients on 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 are significantly negative. This confirms our 
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hypothesis H4 that banks do not appear to take corporate profitability into account when 
local governments are subject to great political pressure. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
5.6 Political pressure and loan quality: Test of H5 
    Table 8 shows the relation between political pressure and the quality of loans. As 
conjectured, the current pressure is significantly positively associated with non-
performing loans in the subsequent three years. When political pressure arises from the 
inter-party competition, i.e., GAPNB is the dependent variable, the impact of pressure 
on loan quality gradually decreases across periods, with the effect being the strongest 
for the t+1 year. In addition, the proportion of secondary industry to local economy is 
another determinant of bad debts, which supports the statistics of the CBRC showing 
that the secondary industry contributes to the largest share of non-performing loans in 
China.22 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
5.7 Robustness analyses 
5.7.1 Political pressure and excessive loan growth 
As a robustness check, we repeat our analyses using excessive loan growth as the 
dependent variable. A widely used approach explains the expected level of credit 
growth by a set of macroeconomic variables (Hofmann, 2001; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005). 
However, this approach may not be applicable in China. Because bank credit serves 
mainly as a policy tool in China, and it is less reliant on market factors than it is in 
developed economies (Koivu, 2009). In addition, this type of estimation requires data 
over a long period, which is unavailable in China. Excessive credit growth is also 
defined as credit expansion beyond the growth of the real economy (Honohan, 1997; 
Adams et al., 1998). Following this definition, we measure the excessive credit growth 
(Ex∆Loani,t) in the present study as the growth rate of bank loans minus the GDP growth 
                                                             
22 Please find detailed information via the following link: 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/4DE6AD136C6E4F99B9883B7672674FC3.html  
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rate for province i in year t. As can be seen in Table 9, results are similar to those 
reported in previous tables. These results reinforce our evidence of the political 
influence on the bank lending behaviour.  
[Insert Table 9] 
 
5.7.2 Mid-term political pressure and loan growth 
One may argue that, if loan growth is indeed driven by political pressure, we 
should observe more aggressive credit growth in the later years of a five-year cycle if 
the local government has failed to achieve its economic goals in the earlier years. To 
investigate this issue, we re-examine Eq.(1) replacing the independent variable with 
LagGAP5YR, which equals 1 if the average value of GDP growth for the first three years 
is below the target growth rate committed in the five-year plan, and 0 otherwise. Table 
10 presents the results. As shown in both columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on 
LagGAP5YR are positive and significant at the 10% level. This corroborates our 
argument that local governments that have underperformed relative to their economy 
target in the earlier years during a five-year plan may attempt to catch up in the later 
years by expanding bank credit. 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
5.7.3 Political pressure and loan growth: Change specifications 
It is argued in prior literature (Li, 2010a; Kravet and Muslu, 2013) that change 
methodology can better prevent statistical inferences from correlated omitted variables 
and reverse causality problems. In an attempt to address the potential concerns, we 
repeat all analysis by employing change specifications, in which all variables except 
for dummy are measured by the annual change from year t-1 to year t. As shown in 
Table 11, our main inferences are not quantitatively affected by the change 
methodology.23 
[Insert Table 11] 
                                                             
23 The full results are presented in Appendix Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 so as to save space. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the association between credit growth and political 
pressure in the context of China. Using a unique dataset of Chinese banks for the period 
2002-2011, we obtain the following findings: First, political pressure is positively 
associated with credit growth, and the relation is more pronounced for loans issued by 
the Big Four state-owned banks. Our findings support the “political” view that 
government officials may participate in bank decisions making because of their political 
objectives. Next, the relation is attenuated in regions with more developed banking 
sectors, suggesting that the institutional environment is an external monitoring and 
governance mechanism for banks. Finally, as a result of growing political intervention, 
lending decisions of banks becomes less commercially oriented and loan quality is 
going down. Overall, our findings suggest that the political motives significantly affect 
the amount of credit issued by banks in China. 
Our findings have implications for regulators, banks and investors. For policy 
makers in transitional economies, given the pervasiveness of political influence in the 
financial markets, further rules and regulations should be promulgated to make banks’ 
lending decisions more commercially oriented and to create a more impartial playing 
field for all types of banks. In addition, banks can utilize the results if they want to 
improve efficiency. Particularly, state-owned banks are likely to benefit from ongoing 
partial privatization by introducing foreign strategic investors. Finally, investors can 
benefit from our study through increased awareness of the association between political 
pressure and bank lending decisions. 
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Table 1: Sample selection 
This table reports the sample selection criteria. For the 300 province-year observations, we have manually 
collected the following data: bank loans (from China Banking Regulatory Commission), targets of GDP growth 
(from regional five-year plans and government annual reports), characteristics of provincial leaders (from 
People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Net), and some macroeconomic estimates (from China Statistical Yearbooks).  
Sample selection process Observations 
Initial sample of 31 provinces for 2002 to 2011 310 
Less:  
Observations of Tibet province 10 
Province-year without targets of GDP growth from the government 
five-year plans 
6 
Final sample 294 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table shows summary statistics of the main variables. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
ΔLoan 300 0.141 0.140 0.085 -0.310 0.350 
NPLoan 150 0.012 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.029 
GAP5YR 294 -0.225 -0.224 0.121 -0.621 0.111 
GAPNB 300 0.020 0.004 0.150 -0.459 0.544 
ΔGDP 300 0.127 0.126 0.022 0.054 0.238 
ΔDeposit 300 0.158 0.150 0.052 -0.120 0.320 
Branch 300 7.948 8.009 0.698 6.100 9.385 
SOE 300 0.416 0.422 0.119 0.184 0.731 
Fiscal 300 0.560 0.543 0.104 0.351 0.879 
Openness 300 0.356 0.148 0.446 0.029 3.609 
Industry 300 0.476 0.487 7.549 0.207 0.615 
Surplus 300 0.246 0.252 0.064 0.075 0.383 
Age 300 58.720 60.000 5.222 36.000 69.000 
Age60 300 0.506 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Tenure 300 3.545 3.000 2.486 0.083 14.000 
Promotion 300 0.423 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Education 300 1.553 1.000 0.780 0.000 3.000 
Experience 300 0.420 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix of variables used in the main analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
ΔLoan                 
GAP5YR 0.265
***                
GAPNB 0.101
* 0.625***               
ΔGDP 0.088 -0.663*** -0.553***              
ΔDeposit 0.670*** 0.004 -0.144** 0.072             
Branch 0.125** -0.084 -0.103* 0.073 0.076            
SOE -0.251*** 0.174*** 0.241*** -0.230*** -0.237*** -0.536***           
Fiscal 0.102* -0.121** -0.046 0.140** 0.054 0.469*** -0.639***          
Openness 0.011 -0.083 -0.024 0.012 -0.012 0.225*** -0.398*** 0.705***         
Surplus -0.099* -0.240*** -0.209*** 0.450*** -0.077 0.352*** -0.391*** 0.165** 0.287***        
Industry 0.024 -0.073 -0.260*** 0.299*** 0.094 0.334*** -0.240*** 0.061 0.113** 0.429***       
Age 0.071 -0.007 -0.063 0.043 0.084 0.115** -0.165*** 0.186*** 0.084 0.068 -0.129**      
Age60 -0.013 -0.008 -0.039 0.051 0.015 0.068 -0.057 0.116** 0.043 0.101* -0.124** 0.722***     
Tenure -0.055 0.072 0.139** -0.079 -0.028 -0.116** 0.221*** -0.049 0.011 -0.033 -0.155*** 0.061 0.242***    
Promotion -0.083 0.089 0.142** -0.119** -0.074 -0.050 0.034 0.120** 0.077 -0.030 -0.194*** -0.069 -0.004 0.123**   
Education 0.108** 0.023 0.031 0.039 0.080 0.021 -0.052 0.036 -0.042 -0.059 -0.034 -0.354*** -0.317*** -0.145*** 0.127**  
Experience 0.059 -0.065 -0.059 0.080 0.097* 0.074 -0.119** 0.096* 0.034 0.029 0.021 -0.143** -0.241*** -0.255*** -0.168*** 0.331*** 
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Table 4: Political pressure and credit growth 
This table reports results of panel regressions that estimate the impact of political pressure (GAP5YR, GAPNB) on 
provincial credit growth. The dependent variable is annual growth rate of the total bank loans (ΔLoan). Variables 
are defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, and * indicate significant difference 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided).  
 Expected 
Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP5YR + 0.073* 0.072**   
  (1.929) (2.114)   
GAPNB +   0.079** 0.076* 
    (2.248) (1.869) 
ΔGDP + 0.614*** 0.589*** 0.889*** 0.841*** 
  (3.356) (3.791) (3.089) (2.820) 
ΔDeposit + 0.880*** 0.883*** 0.843*** 0.848*** 
  (11.449) (11.359) (9.943) (10.194) 
Branch + 0.011 0.012* 0.010 0.011 
  (1.457) (1.781) (1.370) (1.657) 
SOE + 0.042 0.039 0.026 0.023 
  (0.988) (0.914) (0.676) (0.557) 
Fiscal - -0.040 -0.036 -0.035 -0.030 
  (-1.106) (-1.056) (-0.849) (-0.772) 
Openness + 0.012* 0.012* 0.011 0.011 
  (1.907) (1.929) (1.570) (1.556) 
Industry - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.816) (-0.798) (-0.594) (-0.634) 
Age ?  0.001  0.001 
   (1.289)  (1.274) 
Age60 -  -0.014*  -0.012 
   (-1.885)  (-1.653) 
Tenure ?  -0.000  -0.000 
   (-0.169)  (-0.415) 
Promotion -  -0.005  -0.006 
   (-0.722)  (-0.878) 
Education +  0.005  0.005 
   (1.281)  (1.294) 
Experience ?  -0.007  -0.007 
   (-1.116)  (-1.080) 
Intercept  -0.176 -0.262** -0.217** -0.279*** 
  (-1.487) (-2.108) (-2.645) (-3.280) 
Year  Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  294 294 300 300 
R-square  0.759 0.770 0.759 0.769 
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Table 5: Subsample analysis: Big Four banks, other domestic banks and foreign banks 
This table reports results of panel regressions that estimate the impact of political pressure (GAP5YR, GAPNB) on 
provincial credit growth. In models (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of total loans 
made by Big Four state-owned banks. In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the annual growth rate 
of total loans made by other domestic banks. Finally, in models (5) and (6), the annual growth rate of total loans 
made by foreign banks is used. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, 
**, and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided).  
 Expected Big 4 state-owned banks Other domestic banks Foreign banks 
 Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (6) 
GAP5YR + 0.061*  0.019  0.008  
  (1.718)  (0.279)  (1.513)  
GAPNB +  0.075*  -0.025  -0.006 
   (1.765)  (-0.362)  (-0.716) 
ΔGDP + 0.672*** 0.990*** -0.238 -0.444 0.030 -0.060 
  (3.840) (3.357) (-0.461) (-0.617) (1.078) (-0.849) 
ΔDeposit + 0.728*** 0.675*** 1.115*** 1.109*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (7.801) (7.059) (6.788) (6.994) (6.226) (5.919) 
Branch + -0.004 -0.005 -0.023 -0.023 -0.001 -0.002* 
  (-0.473) (-0.604) (-1.316) (-1.372) (-1.213) (-1.886) 
SOE + 0.009 -0.009 -0.111 -0.114 -0.001 0.002 
  (0.193) (-0.194) (-1.308) (-1.398) (-0.146) (0.193) 
Fiscal - -0.112** -0.108** -0.052 -0.048 -0.018** -0.011 
  (-2.496) (-2.153) (-1.022) (-0.798) (-2.204) (-1.433) 
Openness + 0.023** 0.023** -0.000 0.000 -0.002* -0.003* 
  (2.756) (2.472) (-0.029) (0.009) (-1.978) (-2.035) 
Industry - 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.000** -0.000 
  (0.138) (0.101) (1.340) (1.446) (-2.683) (-0.569) 
Age ? 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
  (1.483) (1.382) (1.316) (1.266) (-1.209) (-0.758) 
Age60 - -0.010 -0.008 -0.013 -0.013 0.001 -0.000 
  (-1.182) (-0.910) (-0.828) (-0.804) (0.611) (-0.040) 
Tenure ? -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.096) (-0.300) (1.604) (1.621) (-0.611) (-0.116) 
Promotion - -0.006 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.750) (-1.000) (-1.020) (-1.038) (-1.191) (-0.390) 
Education + 0.008* 0.008* 0.016 0.015 -0.000 0.000 
  (1.856) (1.853) (1.412) (1.383) (-0.887) (0.362) 
Experience ? -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002* 
  (-0.802) (-0.863) (-0.703) (-0.809) (-1.425) (-1.807) 
Intercept  -0.121 -0.146 0.057 0.067 0.040*** 0.051*** 
  (-0.805) (-1.251) (0.331) (0.398) (3.053) (2.903) 
Year  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  294 300 292 298 76 78 
R-square  0.678 0.679 0.662 0.661 0.387 0.335 
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Table 6: Financial marketization, political pressure and credit growth 
This table reports results of panel regressions that estimate the impact of political pressure (GAP5YR, GAPNB) 
and financial marketization (NERI) on provincial credit growth. The dependent variable is annual growth rate 
of the total bank loans (ΔLoan). NERI is estimated using the financial marketization index that is developed by 
the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) of China. Each year provinces are grouped into terciles (=3 
for the highest, =1 for the lowest) based on their marketization level. Variables are defined in Appendix Table 
A.2, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The numbers reported in the 
parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-sided). 
 
Expected 
Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP5YR + 0.180** 0.176**   
  (2.299) (2.464)   
GAP5YR × NERI - -0.048* -0.046*   
  (-1.727) (-1.759)   
GAPNB +   0.233*** 0.244*** 
    (3.094) (3.291) 
GAPNB × NERI -   -0.061** -0.065*** 
    (-2.539) (-2.979) 
NERI + 0.037* 0.036* 0.063** 0.068*** 
  (1.718) (1.803) (2.704) (3.148) 
ΔGDP + 0.612*** 0.595*** 0.962*** 0.938*** 
  (3.112) (3.625) (3.008) (2.792) 
ΔDeposit + 0.882*** 0.885*** 0.868*** 0.873*** 
  (12.046) (11.841) (10.548) (10.616) 
Branch + 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 
  (1.610) (1.650) (1.641) (1.608) 
SOE + 0.035 0.032 0.021 0.017 
  (0.795) (0.718) (0.516) (0.396) 
Fiscal - -0.043 -0.044 -0.039 -0.039 
  (-1.174) (-1.256) (-0.964) (-0.977) 
Openness + 0.013** 0.014** 0.011* 0.012* 
  (2.098) (2.120) (1.743) (1.727) 
Industry - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.879) (-0.893) (-0.657) (-0.703) 
Age ?  0.001  0.001 
   (1.228)  (1.353) 
Age60 -  -0.013*  -0.012* 
   (-1.820)  (-1.721) 
Tenure ?  -0.000  -0.001 
   (-0.147)  (-0.699) 
Promotion -  -0.006  -0.006 
   (-0.945)  (-1.056) 
Education +  0.005  0.006 
   (1.229)  (1.428) 
Experience ?  -0.006  -0.005 
   (-1.054)  (-0.838) 
Intercept  -0.292** -0.330** -0.394*** -0.467*** 
  (-2.171) (-2.342) (-3.507) (-4.353) 
Year  Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  294 294 300 300 
R-square  0.761 0.761 0.764 0.766 
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Table 7: Political pressure and provincial profitability 
This table reports results of panel regressions that estimate the impact of political pressure (GAP5YR, GAPNB) 
and provincial profitability (Surplus) on provincial credit growth. The dependent variable is annual growth rate 
of the total bank loans (ΔLoan). Surplus measures the province’s profitability, which is defined as the ratio of 
operating surplus to GDP. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, 
**, and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided). 
 
Expected 
Signs (1) (2) 
Surplus + 0.600** 0.678** 
  (2.152) (2.480) 
GAP5YR + 0.206**  
  (2.457)  
GAP5YR × Surplus - -0.743**  
  (-2.108)  
GAPNB +  0.207** 
   (2.449) 
GAPNB × Surplus -  -0.659** 
   (-2.295) 
ΔGDP + 0.321* 0.529** 
  (1.871) (2.399) 
ΔDeposit + 0.882*** 0.859*** 
  (10.481) (9.688) 
SOE + -0.020 -0.036 
  (-0.672) (-1.120) 
Industry - 0.000 0.000 
  (0.460) (0.562) 
Intercept ? -0.129 -0.251*** 
  (-1.493) (-2.822) 
Characteristics of 
provincial leaders 
 Controlled Controlled 
Year  Y Y 
Obs.  294 300 
R-square  0.751 0.752 
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Table 8: Political pressure and the quality of loans 
This table reports results of panel regressions that estimate the impact of political pressure (GAP5YR, GAPNB) on 
the quality of bank loans (NPLoan). The dependent variable is NPLoan, which is defined as the amount of non-
performing loans divided by total loans. M-structure is defined as CR4 in loan market. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Limited by data availability, loan quality data only have a relative short period (note: five years from 2009 to 
2013). The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, and * indicate significant 
difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided).  
 Expected NPLoant+1 NPLoant+2 NPLoant+3 
 Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GAP5YR, t + 0.006**  0.005*  0.007**  
  (2.106)  (1.729)  (2.104)  
GAPNB, t +  0.008***  0.005**  0.004* 
   (4.339)  (2.714)  (1.866) 
ΔGDPt+1/t+2/t+3 ? 0.028 0.015 0.046 -0.016 -0.008 -0.017 
  (1.072) (0.499) (1.446) (-0.567) (-0.327) (-0.618) 
Fiscalt+1/t+2/t+3 ? -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
  (-0.251) (-0.033) (-0.090) (-0.327) (-0.571) (-0.429) 
Industryt+1/t+2/t+3 + 0.009 0.013* 0.014** 0.015** 0.011* 0.015*** 
  (1.431) (1.775) (2.362) (2.631) (1.990) (2.935) 
M-structuret+1/t+2/t+3 + 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  (1.922) (1.162) (1.292) (0.470) (-0.277) (-0.456) 
Intercept  -0.004 -0.012 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (-0.436) (-1.270) (0.263) (-0.039) (0.137) (0.208) 
Year  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  114 120 144 150 144 150 
R-square  0.404 0.468 0.398 0.437 0.408 0.431 
  
35 
Table 9: Robust check: Excessive credit growth 
This table repeated the analysis of table 6 using the excessive credit growth (ExΔLoan) as the dependent variable. 
ExΔLoan is measured as the ratio of annual growth rate of bank loans to annual growth rate of GDP. Variables 
are defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, and * indicate significant difference 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided). 
 
Expected 
Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP5YR + 0.785*** 1.817***   
  (2.916) (3.329)   
GAP5YR × NERI -  -0.462**   
   (-2.304)   
GAPNB +   0.896** 2.450*** 
    (2.068) (3.987) 
GAPNB × NERI -    -0.603*** 
     (-3.476) 
NERI +  0.363**  0.633*** 
   (2.402)  (3.727) 
ΔGDP ? -3.655** -3.720** -0.433 0.406 
  (-2.317) (-2.537) (-0.135) (0.141) 
ΔDeposit + 6.503*** 6.524*** 6.146*** 6.380*** 
  (10.382) (10.759) (9.538) (10.007) 
Branch + 0.116* 0.118** 0.102* 0.106* 
  (1.967) (2.074) (1.762) (1.912) 
SOE + 0.444 0.375 0.253 0.208 
  (1.142) (0.918) (0.687) (0.511) 
Fiscal - -0.169 -0.212 -0.105 -0.167 
  (-0.573) (-0.719) (-0.316) (-0.503) 
Openness + 0.091* 0.104** 0.079 0.086 
  (1.862) (2.077) (1.491) (1.629) 
Industry - -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.923) (-1.042) (-0.608) (-0.698) 
Age ? 0.012* 0.011 0.011* 0.011* 
  (1.746) (1.631) (1.798) (1.850) 
Age60 - -0.111* -0.101 -0.093 -0.090 
  (-1.783) (-1.686) (-1.565) (-1.669) 
Tenure ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.009 
  (-0.309) (-0.304) (-0.654) (-0.960) 
Promotion - -0.046 -0.058 -0.048 -0.053 
  (-0.840) (-1.100) (-0.967) (-1.160) 
Education + 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.037 
  (1.051) (0.965) (1.044) (1.192) 
Experience ? -0.062 -0.053 -0.062 -0.041 
  (-1.263) (-1.142) (-1.170) (-0.861) 
Intercept  -2.545** -3.287*** -2.966*** -4.666*** 
  (-2.510) (-3.021) (-3.508) (-5.635) 
Year  Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  294 294 300 300 
R-square  0.759 0.761 0.762 0.771 
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Table 10: Mid-term political pressure and credit growth 
This table reports the results of panel regressions that estimate the impact of political pressure (GAP5YR) on 
provincial credit growth before the end of each five-year plan period. We restrict our sample to the last two 
years of the period of a five-year plan. The dependent variable is annual growth rate of the total bank loans 
(ΔLoan). The key explanatory variable is the LagGAP5YR, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the average 
of GAP5YR over the first three years is below the target set in the five-year plan, and 0 otherwise. Variables are 
defined in Appendix Table A.2, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The 
numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, and * indicate significant difference at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels separately (two-sided). 
 
Expected 
Signs (1) (2) 
LagGAP5YR + 0.021* 0.023* 
  (1.725) (1.918) 
ΔGDP + 0.506 0.604** 
  (1.671) (2.183) 
ΔDeposit + 1.017*** 1.038*** 
  (10.369) (9.486) 
Branch + -0.016* -0.016** 
  (-1.976) (-2.169) 
SOE + 0.048 0.033 
  (0.901) (0.677) 
Fiscal - -0.213** -0.208** 
  (-2.761) (-2.672) 
Openness + 0.038** 0.037* 
  (2.200) (1.951) 
Industry - -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.121) (-0.364) 
Age ?  0.002 
   (1.175) 
Age60 -  -0.032** 
   (-2.083) 
Tenure ?  0.001 
   (0.638) 
Promotion -  -0.009 
   (-0.701) 
Education +  0.005 
   (0.709) 
Experience ?  -0.013 
   (-1.171) 
Intercept  0.148 0.055 
  (1.416) (0.354) 
Year  Y Y 
Obs.  116 116 
R-square  0.833 0.834 
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Table 11: Change model testing the influence of political pressure 
The table repeated the analysis of main tables using the change model. In particular, Panel A uses the 
specification of columns 2 and 4 of Table 4; Panel B repeated the columns 2 and 4 of Table 6; Panel C follows 
Tables 7; Panel D uses the specification of columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, respectively. Only the key variables are 
selected and reported in this table and the full results are shown in the Appendix Tables A3 – A5. All continuous 
variables are converted into change form. We thus lose one year observations due to this. The numbers reported 
in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels separately (two-sided). Variables are defined in Appendix Table 2 and previous tables.  
Panel A: Credit growth 
 Expected Dep var: Change ΔLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.138***  
  (3.413)  
ChGAPNB +  0.039* 
   (1.852) 
Obs.  264 270 
R-square  0.711 0.701 
 
Panel B: Credit growth: subsample results 
 Expected 
Dep var: Change 
ΔLoan_big4 
Dep var: Change 
ΔLoan_other 
Dep var: Change 
ΔLoan_foreign 
 Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.148***  -0.063  0.094  
  (3.668)  (-0.789)  (0.952)  
ChGAPNB +  0.032  -0.048  0.043 
   (1.347)  (-1.226)  (0.381) 
Obs.  263 270 260 267 65 67 
R-square  0.713 0.703 0.727 0.721 -0.138 -0.132 
 
Panel C: Financial marketization 
 Expected Dep var: Change ΔLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.194**  
  (2.553)  
ChGAP5YR × NERI - -0.030  
  (-0.854)  
ChGAPNB +  0.145*** 
   (2.883) 
ChGAPNB × NERI -  -0.046** 
   (-2.384) 
NERI + 0.006* 0.007** 
  (1.866) (2.188) 
Obs.  264 270 
R-square  0.711 0.701 
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Panel D: Provincial profitability 
 Expected Dep var: Change ΔLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.204***  
  (3.024)  
ChGAP5YR × Surplus - -1.337**  
  (-2.110)  
ChGAPNB +  0.077* 
   (1.738) 
ChGAPNB × Surplus -  -0.800*** 
   (-3.122) 
ChSurplus + -0.169 -0.088 
  (-1.520) (-0.888) 
Obs.  264 270 
R-square  0.748 0.739 
 
 
Panel E: Quality of loans 
 Expected Dep var: Change NPLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.003*  
  (1.713)  
ChGAPNB +  0.001 
   (0.906) 
Obs.  114 120 
R-square  0.373 0.368 
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Table A.1: Banking market development by region and year 
This table reports the degree of banking market development by province and year. We measure it as the 
percentage of bank loans issued to non-state-owned enterprises. Data is from the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) Index of the Marketization of China’s provinces, which is constructed by Fan et al. (2011).  
Province 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
Eastern regions 
Beijing 5.97 5.84 6.25 5.38 6.73 6.99 11.24 10.98 7.42 
Tianjin 6.26 6.32 7.46 7.23 5.62 7.35 11.7 11.47 7.93 
Hebei 6.12 7.39 8.41 9.18 10.01 10.58 13.26 13.01 9.75 
Fujian 8.56 9.54 10.56 10.73 10.59 11.65 13.92 13.90 11.18 
Guangdong 9.49 10.36 10.93 11.30 11.18 11.91 13.97 14.04 11.65 
Hainan 6.77 9.22 9.76 11.48 10.72 10.98 13.8 13.81 10.82 
Jiangsu 8.35 10.00 10.82 11.43 10.96 11.56 13.85 13.74 11.34 
Zhejiang 10.59 11.49 11.41 12.22 12.61 13.15 14.65 14.61 12.59 
Shandong 6.41 7.43 8.44 10.11 10.04 10.76 13.51 13.41 10.01 
Shanghai 8.88 9.76 9.70 9.78 9.92 9.97 12.94 13.02 10.50 
Central regions 
Anhui 5.30 7.07 7.52 7.83 8.73 9.75 13.22 13.18 9.08 
Henan 4.23 5.49 6.90 8.06 8.56 9.07 12.6 12.84 8.47 
Hubei 1.30 3.90 4.82 6.00 6.99 7.73 12.16 12.39 6.91 
Jiangxi 2.41 4.51 5.85 7.74 8.12 9.03 12.83 12.95 7.93 
Shanxi 6.08 6.87 7.52 7.22 9.68 9.61 13.2 12.58 9.10 
Hunan 4.02 6.58 7.42 8.56 9.03 9.61 13.29 13.26 8.97 
Northeastern regions 
Liaoning 5.20 5.75 6.78 8.02 8.92 10.23 13.32 13.47 8.96 
Jilin 0.77 2.40 3.71 2.69 2.92 5.94 10.83 11.50 5.10 
Heilongjiang 0.88 2.92 3.68 4.57 5.08 6.14 10.97 11.51 5.72 
Western regions 
Inner-Mongolia 3.17 5.05 6.09 7.92 8.25 8.94 12.38 13.06 8.11 
Guangxi 4.41 4.90 5.82 8.78 10.08 10.21 13.46 12.92 8.82 
Chongqing 6.33 8.31 9.20 9.31 9.91 10.14 12.67 11.88 9.72 
Sichuan 6.68 7.89 8.56 8.75 9.22 10.58 4.17 13.14 8.62 
Guizhou 2.07 4.53 4.66 5.99 6.57 7.91 11.94 12.31 7.00 
Yunnan 3.83 5.39 7.61 8.41 10.07 10.05 13.09 12.87 8.92 
Shaanxi 4.62 5.73 7.18 7.92 8.28 7.85 11.78 12.03 8.17 
Gansu 2.61 3.57 4.29 4.85 5.57 7.35 11.50 12.28 6.50 
Qinghai 5.14 7.37 7.76 10.01 8.62 8.85 12.45 12.76 9.12 
Ningxia 4.59 7.39 9.17 10.13 9.46 10.15 12.84 13.11 9.61 
Xinjiang 5.17 7.09 7.53 7.19 7.71 7.67 11.79 11.93 8.26 
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Table A.2: Variable definitions 
Variable name Notation Definition 
Main Dep. Variable   
Credit growth ΔLoan Annual growth rate of the total bank loans. 
   
Other Dep. Variables   
Excessive credit growth ExΔLoan Estimated as ΔLoan over ΔGDP, and then minus 1. ΔGDP is the 
annual growth rate of provincial GDP. 
Non-perform loans NPLoan The amount of non-perform loans divided by the amount of total 
loan. 
   
Indep. Variables   
Shortfall of GDP growth to 
target growth rates 
 
GAP5YR The target GDP growth rate set in province’s five-year plan divided 
by the actual GDP growth rate, and then minus 1. 
Shortfall of GDP growth to 
neighbour’s growth rate 
GAPNB Average GDP growth rate of adjacent provinces divided by the 
actual GDP growth rate, and then minus 1. 
   
Control Variables   
GDP growth ΔGDP Annual growth rate of GDP. 
Deposit growth Deposit Annual growth rate of the total deposits. 
No. of bank branches Branch The logarithm of the number of bank branches. 
Percent of state-owned 
economy 
SOE The ratio of revenues from state-owned enterprises to those from 
all enterprises in each province. 
Fiscal decentralization Fiscal (Local fiscal expenditure per capita/central and local fiscal 
expenditure per capita) *[1-(provincial GDP/national GDP)] 
Economic openness Openness The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. 
Industry structure Industry The value created by the secondary industry divided by GDP. 
Age of provincial leaders Age The age of the provincial committee secretary. 
Provincial leaders is 60 or 
older 
Age60 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the provincial committee 
secretary is 60 or older, and 0 otherwise. 
Tenure of provincial leaders Tenure The number of years the provincial committee secretary has been 
in the post. 
Promotion of provincial 
leaders 
Promotion A dummy variable that equals 1 if the provincial committee 
secretary was promoted from inner-provincial governments. 
Education background of 
provincial leaders 
Education The education level of the provincial committee secretary: PhD = 
3, Master = 2, Bachelor = 1, and zero otherwise. 
Economics expertise of 
provincial leaders 
Experience A dummy variable that equals 1 if the provincial committee 
secretary held a post in provincial or higher levels of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, Economic and Trade 
Commission, People’s Bank of China, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, or China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table A.3: Change model for credit growth 
This table presents regression results on the impact of political pressure on credit growth basing on change 
model. The observation unit is province-year. All variables in this table are change form. We loss one year 
observations due to get change form. The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, 
and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels separately (two-sided). 
 Expected Dep var: Change ΔLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.138*** 0.194**   
  (3.413) (2.553)   
ChGAP5YR × NERI -  -0.030   
   (-0.854)   
ChGAPNB +   0.039* 0.145*** 
    (1.852) (2.883) 
ChGAPNB × NERI -    -0.046** 
     (-2.384) 
NERI +  0.006*  0.007** 
   (1.866)  (2.188) 
ChΔGDP ? 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.127) (0.287) (0.014) (0.250) 
ChΔDeposit + 0.689*** 0.697*** 0.626*** 0.640*** 
  (6.618) (6.761) (5.448) (5.653) 
ChBranch + -0.004 -0.005** -0.004* -0.006** 
  (-1.682) (-2.230) (-1.756) (-2.267) 
ChSOE + 0.059 0.051 0.085 0.080 
  (0.622) (0.570) (0.832) (0.845) 
ChFiscal - -0.003 0.010 0.024 0.028 
  (-0.074) (0.202) (0.512) (0.615) 
ChOpenness + 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.079) (0.177) (-0.748) (-0.485) 
ChIndustry - 0.004* 0.004* 0.004 0.004 
  (1.715) (1.748) (1.462) (1.538) 
Age ? 0.001* 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
  (1.718) (1.306) (2.198) (1.604) 
Age60 - -0.011 -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 
  (-1.247) (-1.136) (-1.627) (-1.330) 
Tenure ? 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.367) (0.659) (0.351) (0.652) 
Promotion - -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
  (-0.795) (-0.969) (-0.930) (-1.065) 
Education + 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.422) (0.474) (0.853) (0.803) 
Experience ? 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 
  (0.717) (0.892) (0.480) (0.809) 
Intercept  -0.089** -0.077* -0.102** -0.082* 
  (-2.132) (-1.730) (-2.370) (-1.739) 
Year  Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  264 264 270 270 
R-square  0.711 0.712 0.701 0.704 
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Table A.4: Change model for lending behaviour 
This table presents regression results on the impact of political pressure on lending behavior basing on change 
model. The observation unit is province-year. All variables in this table are change form. We loss one year 
observations due to get change form. The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. ***, **, 
and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels separately (two-sided). 
 Expected Dep var: Change ΔLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.204***  
  (3.024)  
ChGAP5YR × Surplus - -1.337**  
  (-2.110)  
ChGAPNB +  0.077* 
   (1.738) 
ChGAPNB × Surplus -  -0.800*** 
   (-3.122) 
ChSurplus + -0.169 -0.088 
  (-1.520) (-0.888) 
ChΔGDP + 0.941** 0.358 
  (2.136) (0.822) 
ChΔDeposit + 0.805*** 0.778*** 
  (8.484) (7.856) 
ChSOE + 0.095 0.123 
  (0.973) (1.167) 
ChIndustry - 0.003 0.002 
  (1.267) (0.963) 
Intercept  -0.069*** -0.074*** 
  (-7.477) (-7.469) 
Year  Y Y 
Obs.  264 270 
R-square  0.748 0.739 
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Table A.5: Change model for non-performing loan 
This table presents regression results on the impact of political pressure on non-performing loan basing on 
change model. The observation unit is province-year. All variables in this table are change form. We loss one 
year observations due to get change form. The numbers reported in the parentheses are clustered by province. 
***, **, and * indicate significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels separately (two-sided). 
 Expected Dep var: Change NPLoan 
 Signs (1) (2) 
ChGAP5YR + 0.003*  
  (1.713)  
ChGAPNB +  0.001 
   (0.906) 
ChΔGDP ? -0.028 -0.017 
  (-1.318) (-0.865) 
ChFiscal ? -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.556) (-0.536) 
ChIndustry + 0.000 0.000 
  (0.304) (0.209) 
ChM-structure + -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (-3.443) (-3.797) 
Intercept  -0.001** -0.001** 
  (-2.674) (-2.515) 
Year  Y Y 
Obs.  114 120 
R-square  0.373 0.368 
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Figure 1: Structure of China’s commercial banks 
Data source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (2011) 
